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Abstract
In this paper we document evidence of systemic risk taking from syndicated loan
pricing. Using U.S. syndicated loan data, we find that the borrower’s idiosyncratic risk is
positively priced whereas systematic risk is negatively related to loan spreads, controlling
for firm, loan and bank specific variables. We argue that the underpricing of systematic
risk relative to idiosyncratic risk suggests banks’ preference for investing in systematic risk
which increases interbank correlation and systemic risk of banks. We relate the incentive
for systemic risk-taking to the “too-many-to-fail” guarantee. We further show that small
and lowly correlated banks underprice systematic risk relative to big and more correlated
banks.
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1 Introduction
There has been a burgeoning literature that tries to identify and explain bank risk-taking
(Laeven and Levine, 2009; Keeley, 1990; Gropp, Gruendl and Guettler, 2013; Gropp, Hakenes
and Schnabel, 2010; Deyoung, Peng and Yan, 2013; Altunbas, Gambacorta and Marqués-
Ibáñez, 2010). However, little empirical work has been done to examine bank systemic risk-
taking, even though the theoretical importance has been widely recognized. In this paper we
attempt to identify bank systemic risk-taking from mispricing (or underpricing) of aggregate
risk in the syndicated loans and to further relate the systemic risk-taking incentive to “too-
many-to-fail” guarantee, using a sample of the U.S. syndicated loan data over the period 1988
to 2011.
We begin by documenting the evidence of bank systemic risk-taking in the syndicated
loan markets from loan pricing. As a debt contract, a syndicated loan is priced to reflect
its underlying credit risk, which can be decomposed into aggregate (or systematic) and
idiosyncratic risks. A bank can increase its systemic risk by betting on aggregate exposures
of loans. In principle, aggregate risk which cannot be diversified away is expected to be
priced relative to diversifiable idiosyncratic risk. However, the underpricing of aggregate risk
relative to idiosyncratic risk can be interpreted as evidence of banks undertaking excessive
(incorrectly priced) systemic risk. In this study we use systematic and idiosyncratic equity
volatilities of the borrower as proxies for the aggregate and idiosyncratic credit risks of the
loan contract. We show that loan spreads are positively related to borrowers’ idiosyncratic
risk whereas negatively related to aggregate risk, controlling for borrower, loan and lender
specific factors, and year dummies. The mispricing of aggregate risk can be taken as evidence
of bank taking systemic risk. This pricing pattern is robust to risk measures of equity volatility
from CAPM regression and Fama-French three factor regression. In addition, we show that
such pricing pattern is not driven by borrowers’ or lenders’ unobserved heterogeneity as our
results continue to hold when including firm fixed effects and bank fixed effects.
The underpricing of aggregate risk suggests that the systemic risk-taking behavior cannot
be explained by the “search for yield” hypothesis that banks invest in systematically risky
loans to earn high risk premium. By contrast, we show that the underpricing of aggregate risk
is consistent with the prediction of the regulatory arbitrage hypothesis that banks may exploit
the benefits of public guarantees. In particular, banks protected by the public guarantee
1
expect to be bail out in systemic crisis and therefore are less concerned with aggregate risk. By
contrast, nonbank lenders which have no bailout expectation should correctly price aggregate
risk ex ante. Therefore, we test the impact of the presence of public guarantee on loan
pricing. The regression results show no evidence of systemic risk-taking by nonbank lenders
as the aggregate risk is pronouncedly priced relative to idiosyncratic risk in the cohort of
loans originated by nonbank lenders which are not protected by the government guarantees
as commercial banks are. The sharp discrepancy in pricing patterns between banks and
nonbank lenders reveals the impacts on the presence of government guarantees on systemic
risk-taking.
We show that our results are not driven by “too-big-to-fail” guarantee, but rather are
explainable by the “too-many-too-fail” guarantee. According to the “too-big-to-fail” story,
big banks are expected to take more risk as protected by the “too-big-to-fail” guarantee in
crisis. When interacting borrower’s aggregate and idiosyncratic risks with bank size dummy,
however, we find small banks charge lower spreads on aggregate risk relative to big banks.
When splitting the sample into small bank group and big bank group, we find only small
banks underprice aggregate risk. By contrast, small banks have stronger incentives to take
systemic risk as the bailout subsidy increases for small banks when big banks also fail but it
does not increase for big banks when small banks fail as big banks can acquire failed small
banks. The increment of systemic importance by taking systemic risk can raise the likelihood
of failing together, and therefore is especially valuable for small banks. To corroborate the
argument that systemic risk-taking is driven by the “too-many-to-fail” guarantee, we further
interact interbank correlation dummy with borrower’s aggregate and idiosyncratic risks. The
results suggest that lowly correlated banks charge lower spreads on aggregate risk relative to
highly correlated banks, consistent with the “too-many-to-fail” story that lowly correlated
banks are inclined to increase the likelihood of collective bailout by taking systemic risk.
On top of the evidence from loan pricing, we provide evidence of “too-many-to-fail”
guarantee driven systemic risk-taking from lending amounts. We show that lowly correlated
banks tend to lend more to systematically risky borrowers in both relative facility shares and
absolute loan amounts.
This paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, in spite of fruitful studies
on bank risk-taking in general, the specific research on bank systemic risk-taking has been
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restrained to theoretical models as it is challenging to identify systemic risk taking behavior
in real world. Our paper adds new empirical evidence of bank systemic risk-taking from
the syndicated loan market. Unlike Cai, Saunders and Steffen (2011) which also document
bank systemic risk-taking based bank interconnectedness constructed from syndicated loan
portfolios, we illustrate systemic risk taking from mispricing of aggregate risk of loans. The
method of identifying risk-taking from mispricing of risk has also been applied in Ioannidou,
Ongena and Peydro (2008) and Paligorova and Santos( 2012).
Second, “too-many-to-fail” problem has become a popular agenda in bank regulation
especially since the recent financial crisis (see Dam and Koetter, 2012; Vives, 2011). However,
scarce empirical work has been done in testing this theory. The only exception is Brown and
Dinc (2009) which documents evidence of the “too-many-to-fail” effect that regulators are ex
post reluctant to close failed banks when other banks in the country are also weak. Our paper
is the first work that unveils evidence that banks ex ante have incentives to take exposures to
systematic risk factors in expectation of the “too-many-to-fail” guarantee. Broadly speaking,
our work also contributes to the empirical study of public guarantees on bank risk-taking
by providing evidence that public guarantees encourage protected banks risk-taking. This
finding is similar to the moral hazard effect of deposit insurance in the literature (Merton,
1977).
One caveat of our research is that we document systemic risk-taking from syndicated
loans, which is only one asset category of banks. Other assets types such as mortgage lending
and mortgage back securities (MBS) are also shown to be important vehicles for bank herding
and systemic risk-taking (Ma, 2014).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our data, methodol-
ogy and summary statistics. Section 3 examines bank systemic risk-taking from loan pricing.
Section 4 analyzes the incentive for systemic risk-taking and highlights the importance of
public guarantees. Section 5 first rejects the role of “too-big-to-fail” guarantee in bank
systemic risk-taking and then shows the effect of the “too-many-to-fail” guarantee. Section
6 shows banks not only underprice aggregate risk but also lend more to systematically risky
borrowers. In the end, we conclude in section 7.
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2 Data, Methodology and Summary Statistics
2.1 Data
Obtaining syndicated loan data from LPC Dealscan, we focus on U.S. firms borrowing from
U.S. banks over the period between 1988 and 20111. We exclude loans borrowed by companies
in the financial sector from our sample (SIC codes 6000 to 6400, Finance and Insurance). Our
analysis focuses on lead arrangers, which are delegated to collect information and monitor
the borrower on behalf of the syndicate and set loan terms and pricing2. Syndicated loans
are usually structured in a number of facilities, also called tranches. We treat facilities in
each deal as different loans because spreads, identity of lenders and other contractual features
often vary within a syndicated loan deal. This is a common practice in loan pricing literature
(See similar analyses in Carey and Nini, 2007; Focarelli, Pozzolo and Casolaro, 2008; Santos,
2011). Therefore, each observation in our regressions corresponds to a syndicated loan facility.
Our results are qualitatively unchanged when using loan characteristics of the largest tranche
for loans of multiple tranches or analysis at the deal level.
By merging Dealscan with Compustat, we have detailed annual accounting information of
borrowers3. Compustat consists of annual report data of publicly listed American companies,
which are assumed to have less information problems than privately held firms.
To calculate equity volatility of borrowers, we collect daily stock return data over the year
leading up to the facility activation date from CRSP for borrowers listed in NYSE, AMEX
and NASDAQ4. We drop out borrowers with less than 100 trading days available in the event
window5. Moreover, we collect Fama-French Factors from Wharton Research Data Services
(WRDS).
In the end, we focus on loans with single lead arranger so that we can clearly identify the
1Before 1987, the coverage of Deanscan is uneven.
2Dealscan indicates the role of each lender. We follow the classification rule in Cai, Saunders and Steffen
(2011). If the variable LeadArrangerCredit indicates “Yes”, a lender is classified as a lead arranger. We correct
for the role of lenders of loans that LeadArrangerCredit indicates “Yes” but “LenderRole” falls into participant
as non-lead arranger. In addition, if no lead arranger is identified, we treat a lender as a lead arranger if
its “LenderRole” is classified as following items: Admin agent, Agent, Arranger, Bookrunner, Coordinating
arranger, Lead arranger, Lead bank, Lead manager, Mandated arranger, Mandated Lead arranger.
3We are indebted to Sudheer Chava and Michael Roberts for providing the link between Dealscan with
Compustat, see Chava and Roberts (2008).
4We link LPC Deanscan with Compustat via GVKEY. Next, we use PERMNO to link Compustat with
CRSP.
5Campbell and Taksler (2003) argue that a fairly long event window is required to measure the volatility
that is publicly observed by corporate bond investors.
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impact of lender characteristics on loan pricing6. We manually match lead banks in Dealscan
with commercial banks in Call reports, depending on bank names, geographical locations and
operating dates. We complement the unmatched sample with banking holding companies
from Federal Reserve Y-9C reports. Additionally, we control for mergers and acquisition by
matching the lender to the accounting information of the acquirer.
To calculate the market based interbank correlation, we collect banks’ daily stock return
data one year preceding to the quarter of loan origination from CRSP. The S&P 500 banking
sector index comes from Datastream tracing back to the last quarter of 1989. We link bank
stock return with Call Reports and FY Y9C using the CRSP-FRB link from Federal Reserve
Bank of New York. In particular, we match commercial banks that are subsidiaries of listed
bank holding companies with the stock information of their parent companies.
2.2 Loan pricing model
In a typical loan syndication process, a lead arranger offers a lending rate and negotiates with
the borrower on behalf of the syndicate. In principle, the lead arranger takes into account both
idiosyncratic and aggregate risks of the borrower to evaluate the her capacity of repayment.
According to the standard asset pricing literature, aggregate risk should be priced relative to
idiosyncratic risk. The incorrectly pricing of aggregate risk, that is, aggregate risk is priced
lower than idiosyncratic risk, indicates lenders take excessive aggregate risk. The increment
in aggregate exposures can raise bank systemic risk. Overall, we examine systemic risk-taking
from the relative pricing of aggregate risk to idiosyncratic risk. In addition, the lead arranger
also assesses borrowers other characteristics, lenders characteristics, non-price loan contract
terms and macroeconomic conditions. Therefore, we control for all these information in our
baseline loan pricing model as follows:















6It makes less sense if we aggregate lenders’ characteristics for loans with multiple lead arrangers.
Nevertheless, our results that banks underprice systematic risk relative to idiosyncratic risk hold for loans
granted by multiple lead arrangers.
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where f , i, b and t denote facility, firm, bank and year, respectively. The dependent variable,
LoanSpread, is all-in-drawn spread in Dealscan which denotes an interest spread over Libor
measured in basis points. IdioVol and SysVol represent idiosyncratic and aggregate risks,
respectively. We include firm specific variables (Firmi), loan specific variables (Loanf ) and
bank specific variables (Bankb). We also include year dummies T throughout all specifica-
tions. ε is the error term.
Estimating the baseline loan pricing model, we run cross-sectional OLS regressions that
pool together all valid observations. The following loan pricing models are estimated with
robust standard errors which are clustered at the borrower level to correct for correlation
across observations of a given firm, though our results are insensitive to clustering at lender
or borrower-lender pair levels.
To compute our key independent variables, idiosyncratic and aggregate risks of the bor-
rower, we rely on the borrower’s equity volatilities which are forward-looking and driven by
market information. The idea is that we can think of the holder of risky debt as the owner of
riskless bonds who have issued put options to the holder of firm equity (Merton, 1974). The
strike price equals the face value of the debt and reflects limited liability of equity holders in
the event of default. Increased equity volatility raises the value of put option, benefiting the
equity holder at the expense of the debt holder. Hence a firm with more volatile equity is more
likely to reach the bound condition for default. In addition, there is a burgeoning literature
that applies equity volatility to explain credit spreads. In a seminal paper Campbell and
Taksler (2003) find evidence that equity volatility, especially idiosyncratic equity volatility,
has substantial explanatory power for corporate bond yields. Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2009)
and Ericsson, Jacob and Oviedo (2009) apply the same logic to credit default swap (CDS)
pricing and find equity volatility is an important determinant of CDS spreads. Gaul and
Yusal (2013) also relate equity volatility with loan spreads to explain the “global loan pricing
puzzle” in Carey and Nini (2007). Acharya, Almeida and Campello (2013) use equity beta to
explain the cost of credit lines.
We further decompose borrowers’ equity volatility into idiosyncratic and systematic com-
ponents to proxy idiosyncratic and aggregate risks, respectively. We run a standard CAPM
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regression as follows:
ri,t − rfreet = βCAPMi,t × (rmt − r
free





t are individual stock daily return, market return calculated as the value-
weight return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks in CRSP and risk free return proxied
by the one-month Treasury bill rate, respectively. We define the idiosyncratic volatility as
standard deviation of the residual, IdioV olCAPM=SD(ε). In addition, we define the aggregate
risk as the product of beta and market volatility, SysV olCAPM=βCAPM×MarketV ol, where
MarketV ol is the standard deviation of market excess return, MarketV ol
=SD(rm − rfree).
Alternatively, we adopt Fama French (1993) three-factor model using the following regres-
sion:
ri,t − rfreet = αi,t + βMKTi,t ×MKT t + βSMBi,t × SMBt + βHMLi,t ×HMLt + εi,t (3)
Where the market factor MKTt is the value-weight return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NAS-
DAQ stocks from CRSP minus the one-month Treasury bill rate, the size factor SMBt is
the average return on the three small portfolios minus the average return on the three big
portfolios, the value factor HMLt is the average return on the two value portfolios minus the
average return on the two growth portfolios, respectively. We stick to the standard deviation
of the residual IdioV olFF = SD(ε) as idiosyncratic volatility. On the other hand, we follow
Balin, Brown and Caglayan (2012) and define the aggregate risk in the multifactor model
as the total volatility that is attributable to Fama French factors and the factors’ cross-
covariances, SysV olFF =
√
TotalV ol2 − IdioV olFF 2. In the end, we annualize all equity
volatilities by a multiplier of
√
252 as we use daily stock returns.
We include a number of firm level controls that may affect the lending interest rates.
Sales is the log of the firm’s sales at close in millions of dollars. Larger firms are more
informationally transparent, therefore we expect larger borrowers have lower spreads. Next,
Leverage is a ratio of total debts to total assets. Highly leveraged firms are more likely to
default, hence we expect they are charged a higher lending rate. In addition, we use Z score to
control for the borrowers’ likelihood of bankruptcy. As a higher Z score indicates lower credit
7
risk, we expect firms with higher Z scores to obtain lower loan spreads. Besides, we control
for Profit Margin, which measure the performance and profitability of the borrower. As a
profitable firm is safe and less likely to fall into financial distress, it should be charged a low
spread. As for the firm specific controls that affect loss given default (LGD), we include new
working capital and tangibles assets. NWC measures a ratio of net working capital to total
assets. We expect firms with more net working capital to lose less value in the event of default.
In addition, Tangibles measures a fraction of tangible assets to total assets. Borrowers with
a higher fraction of tangible assets are more informationally transparent (Morgan, 2001) and
have higher values in the event of default as the value of intangible assets are much volatile.
Therefore we expect a lower spread on the loans granted to borrowers with a higher fraction
of tangible assets. We control for Market-to-Book ratio MKTBOOK, an imperfect proxy of
Tobin’s q, which is a ratio of the market value of a firm to its accounting value. We expect a
firm with a higher Market-to-Book ratio to have lower spreads7.
Even though loan specific variables are jointly determined with loan spreads and therefore
are endogenous, we include these contractual features. We include Facility Size, measured by
the log of the tranche amount in millions of dollars. Large loans are likely to be associated
with greater credit risk in the underlying project and lower liquidity, but could also be related
to larger borrowers which have more cushions against adverse shocks. Therefore, the impact
of Facility Size on loan pricing is not unambiguous. Additionally, we include Maturity which
is the maturity of the facility in months. The effect of maturity on loan spreads is also
ambiguous. Next, we use Number of Lenders within a facility and Number of Facilities within
a deal to proxy the syndicated structure. To proxy for the liquidity exposure of each facility, we
classify a loan as a line of credit (Revolver) or a term loan (Term Loan)8. Moreover, we include
dummy variables that indicate whether a loan is senior (Senior) in the borrowers’ liability
structure and whether the loan is secured by collateral (Secured). Seniority and collateral
may reduce the lenders’ loss in the event of default and therefore reduce lending rate, however,
7In the previous version, we include industry dummies that classify borrowers into ten sectors based on
2-digit SIC codes. We expect the industry dummies to capture industrywide risks that borrowers are facing
but not captured by the aforementioned firm controls. However, we exclude industry dummies for fear of
multicollinearity.
8In particular, a loan is classified as a revolver is the loan type is expressed in Dealscan as “364-Day
Facility”, “Revolver/Line < 1 Yr.”, “Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr.”, “Revolver/Term Loan”, “Demand Loan”,
“Limited Line”. Alternatively, a loan is defined as a term loan if the loan type is recorded as “Term Loan”,
“Term Loan A”, “Term Loan B”, “Term Loan C”, “Term Loan F”, “Delay Draw Term Loan”.
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the contractual arrangement may be ex ante required to protect lenders towards specifically
risky borrowers. Therefore, the relation between seniority, collateral and loan pricing is an
empirical question. Last, we control for loan purpose dummies into five categories: Corporate
Purpose, Debt Repayment, Takeover, Working Capital and Other.
As the loan contract is negotiated between the borrower and lenders, we believe that
lenders’ characteristics may have impacts on loan pricing. Santos and Winton (2009) analyze
how bank capital, borrower cash flow and their interaction affect loan pricing. They show
that less capitalized banks charge relatively more for borrowers with low cash flow but offer
discounts for borrowers with high cash flow. Santos (2010) emphasizes the impacts of bank
losses on loan contracts. He shows evidence of credit crunch in the subprime crisis that even
though firms paid higher loan spreads and took out smaller loans during the subprime crisis,
the increase in loan spreads was higher for firms that borrowed from banks that incurred
large losses. In particular, as lead arrangers coordinate the syndication with participants as
well as the negotiation with the borrower, we focus on lead arrangers’ characteristics. First,
we include Size BK as the log of bank total assets in millions of dollars. Large banks usually
have diversified portfolios and good risk management, therefore we expect large banks charge
low lending rates. Next, we control for Capital BK, denoted as a ratio of bank capital to
total assets. Well capitalized banks have more capital buffer and therefore are expected to
charge a lower spread. In addition, we use NPL BK, a ratio of nonperforming loans to total
assets, as a measure of bank credit risk. Risky banks may charge additional compensation for
undertaking extra risk. Hence, we expect banks with a higher proportion of nonperforming
loans to charge a higher spread. We also use Z Score BK as a direct measure of bank risk.
We calculate Z score following Laeven and Levine (2009) but use an eight-quarter rolling
window. Moreover, we include a bank profitability measure ROA BK. More profitable banks
are expected to charge a lower rate. To control for the impact of bank liquidity on loan
rates, we include Liquidity BK to measure the liquidity of bank assets, which a ratio of liquid
securities and cash to total assets. Besides, we include the growth rate of loans (Loan Growth
BK ) to measure investment opportunities of the lender. In the end we use Cost of Funds BK
which is total interest expenses over total liabilities to measure funding costs.
In particular, we use the accounting information of the borrower and lenders from the fiscal
year ending in the calendar year t − 1 for loans made in calendar year t. To eliminate the
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bias from outliers, we winsorize loan spreads, firm and bank specific variables and borrowers’
equity volatilities at 1 and 99 percentile levels9. We include year dummies to capture time
trends throughout the analysis as Santos (2011) has shown the business cycle effect on loan
contracts.
2.3 Summary Statistics
Our final sample consists of 469 U.S. banks granting 11 278 facilities to 4 183 U.S. firms. Table
1 presents summary statistics of our sample before winsorizing. The average loan spread is
208 basis points over Libor. The average CAPM Idiosyncratic Volatility is 0.56, very close to
the mean of total volatility. Since market is usually relatively stable, the average Systematic
Volatility which is the product of Beta and Market Volatility is rather small (0.12), much
smaller than the average beta (0.76). It is worth noting that systematic volatility could
be negative as the beta of some borrowers is negative. The idiosyncratic and systematic
volatilities estimated from CAPM and Fama French three factor models are quite similar.
Looking at firm level controls, we find the average log of firm total assets is 5.6. It is worth
noting that the log of facility size can be negative when the loan is pretty small. The mean
of borrowers’ leverage is 28 percent. On average, the Z score of firms are 4 in our study. The
profit margin is highly skewed, with a mean of -20.75 percent and a median of 3.19 percent.
The mean of net working capital to total assets and tangible assets to total assets are 21 and
69 percent, respectively. The average market to book ratio is 1.82.
We turn to the loan controls in our sample. The average log of facility amount is 3.79.
The information of the retained share of lead arrangers is available for a small proportion of
around 5700 facilities only. On average, a lead arranger retains a share of 56 percent of the
facility. On the other hand, the absolute amount of the lead arranger’s stake is 2.64 when we
look at the log of facility amount. Syndicated loans in our sample have an average maturity
of 43 months. In addition, on average each syndicate has 6 lenders and is structured into 1.77
facilities. Looking at the loan types, 73 percent of loans are lines of credit while 24 percent
are term loans. Almost all loans are senior in the borrower’s liability structure. In the end,
75 percent of loans are secured by collateral.
We check the sample characteristics of banks. Banks are much larger as the average log
9See Table 8 to 10 for detailed information of variables.
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of bank total assets is 18.15. The average equity to asset ratio is 7.56 percent. The average
share of nonperforming loans to gross loans is less than 1 percent. The mean of bank Z score
is 3.17. The average ROA is also below 1 percent. Liquid assets account for 18.77 percent of
total assets. The average loan growth rate is rather high at 22 percent. The average bank has
the cost of funds at 3.42 percent. As not all banks are listed and traded in stock exchanges, we
have the information of interbank correlation for approximately 9200 facilities. The average
interbank correlation is 0.73.
3 Evidence of bank systemic risk-taking from idiosyncratic and aggregate
risks pricing
In this section, we apply the baseline loan pricing model to examine bank systemic risk-taking.
Table 2 reports the results of how the U.S. banks price idiosyncratic and aggregate risks of the
U.S. borrowers. We estimate all specifications with robust standard errors clustered at the firm
level. We present the results using idiosyncratic volatility and systematic volatility estimated
from the CAPM regression in column 1. The coefficient of the idiosyncratic volatility is
positive and significant, indicating banks charge risk premium for bearing idiosyncratic default
of the borrower. On the contrary, the coefficient of aggregate risk is negative and significant,
suggesting that banks underprice aggregate risk. Overall, we find aggregate risk is underpriced
relative to idiosyncratic risk, consistent with bank systemic risk taking. We have similar
results in column 2 in which we use idiosyncratic and systematic volatility estimated from the
Fama French three factor model10. In column 3, we include total volatility as the measure of
credit risk and systematic volatility as the measure of correlation as key variables of interest.
We find a positive and significant coefficient for total volatility which directly suggests banks
dislike credit risk and therefore charge risk premiums. Again, we find negative and significant
coefficient for aggregate risk, indicating that banks underprice aggregate risk.
In addition, the firm characteristics have expected signs and are mostly significant. In
particular, we find that larger firms, firms with higher profit margins, higher net working
capital and tangible assets and higher market to book ratio pay lower loan spreads, whereas
higher leveraged firms are charged higher lending rates. Besides, regarding to the loan specific
10in unreported results, even though equity beta is not comparable to volatility, we use CAPM beta and
market beta in the Fama French three-factor model as measures of aggregate exposure as robustness. We find
similar evidence that banks underprice aggregate risk relative to idiosyncratic risk.
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variables, we find that larger loans with longer maturity, more lenders in the syndicate
are related to lower spreads, while loans with more facilities are charged at a higher rate.
Moreover, lines of credit are generally cheaper. A loan is much cheaper if it is senior as
it ensures the priority of lender to claim to the residual value in the event of borrower
bankruptcy. Furthermore, a secured loan is charged a higher spread than a similar one
without collateral probably because only risky borrowers are required for collateral and are
ex ante charged a risk premium. Last, we find that larger banks, well-capitalized banks, banks
with high cost of funding and high loan growth rates charge lower spreads while risky banks
charge relatively higher spreads. To save space, we do not report the estimated coefficient of
firm, loan and bank specific control variables in the following specifications.
Our baseline specification may be prone to omitted variable bias if unobserved firm
characteristics drive both firm’s equity volatility and loan spreads. We restructure our data
into panel data in which we have i=firm as the cross section dimension and f=facility as the
time dimension. We estimate the firm fixed effects model, allowing for arbitrary correlation
between the unobserved effect and the observed explanatory variables. The identification
comes from the within firm changes in equity volatility and loan spreads. We report the
results in the first two columns of Table 3. The results further confirm our findings that
idiosyncratic volatility is positively priced and systematic volatility is negatively priced. The
weak significance of systematic volatility is the result of short dimension along facilities within
the borrower as each firm borrows on average 2.7 facilities in our sample11. Likewise, to rule
out the effect of unobserved bank characteristics on lending rates, we reorganize our sample
into panel data in which b=bank and f=facility. We estimate a bank fixed effects model that
eliminates the unobserved bank specific effects which are heterogenous across lenders but are
constant over facilities of the same lender. We present basically the same results in columns 3
and 4. We have very statistically significant results as each bank lends on average 30 facilities
in our sample.
Taken together, we find that loan spreads are positively related to idiosyncratic risk but
negatively related to aggregate risk of the borrower. The underpricing of aggregate risk
relative to idiosyncratic risk can be interpreted as evidence of bank systemic risk taking in
syndicated loans. In the next section, we investigate the incentives for banks taking systemic
11We fail to have significant results once we use firm-bank fixed effects as each firm-bank pair has only 1.8
facilities which indicates loss of massive information in regressions.
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risk.
4 Systemic risk-taking and public guarantees: Do nonbank lenders take
systemic risk?
The “search for yield” argument that investors tend to buy riskier assets in order to reach
higher returns is prevailing in the literature (Rajan, 2006; Becker and Ivashina, 2013; Iannotta
and Pennacchi, 2012). However, this hypothesis cannot explain what we find in the syndicated
loan pricing as banks tend to underprice systematically risky loans rather than charging a
risk premium for bearing the aggregate risk. On the contrary, such lending rate discount for
aggregate risk seems to be consistent with the prediction of regulatory arbitrage hypothesis
that banks exploit regulatory subsidies from public guarantees. In particular, banks are
protected by explicit or implicit public guarantees that regulators and government will support
them in systemic crisis in forms of capital injection or liquidity support, whereas the losses
from individual default of borrowers are borne by banks. Hence banks may be less worried
about aggregate risk. On the contrary, nonbank lender peers which are not protected by
any public guarantee should have no incentive to take systemic risk12. In this part, applying
the pricing model to the loans originated by both bank and nonbank investors, we use the
presence (or absence) of public guarantee to identify the impact of guarantees on risk-taking.
The loans originated by nonbank lenders are much fewer than the bank loans in the U.S.
syndicated loan market. We collect 1788 loans granted by finance companies, corporations,
mutual funds and etc. We compare the loan pricing patterns by nonbank lenders and bank
lenders in Table 4. As the accounting information for nonbank lenders is not as accessible
as banks, we only control for borrower, loan specific variables and year dummies. We find
systemic risk and idiosyncratic risks are priced similarly by nonbank lenders in columns 1
and 3. In particular, the estimated coefficient for systematic risk is slightly greater that the
coefficient of idiosyncratic risk, in line with the prediction of the standard asset pricing theory.
In other words, the aggregate risk has been priced in the absence of public guarantee by the
nonbank lenders. For comparison, we report the regression for bank lenders in columns 2 and
4, in which our main results that systematic risk is underpriced relative to idiosyncratic risk
still hold. Overall, the absence of the underpricing of systematic risk in the nonbank lender
12For descriptions of the role of nonbank lenders in the syndicated loan market, see Ivashina and Sun (2011).
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cohort suggests that the systemic risk taking of banks is driven by the public guarantee.
5 Too-big-to-fail or too-many-to-fail?
What kind of public guarantee matters for systemic risk-taking here in the syndicated loan
market? The traditional “too-big-to-fail” theory asserts that certain banks are so large that
their failures may incur huge costs to the economy and that hence they are very likely to get
support from regulators and governments in systemic crisis. Therefore, big banks are likely
to take risk to exploit the safety net, therefore underprice aggregate risk, according to the
“too-big-to-fail” story. But can the systemic risk-taking we observed in the U.S. syndicated
loan market be explained by the “too-big-to-fail” guarantee? To identify the impact of bank
size on risk pricing, we construct a dummy variable SmallBK that equals one if the bank
size is smaller than the median value and zero otherwise. We then interact the small bank
dummy with borrowers’ equity volatilities. Overall, we run the following regression:
LoanSpread i ,f ,b,t =c+ α1IdioV oli,t−1 + α2SysV oli,t−1 + α3IdioV oli,t−1 × SmallBKb,t−1















We present the results in Table 5. In column 1, we find banks generally charge a higher
spread for idiosyncratic risk. The coefficient for systematic risk and the interaction between
idiosyncratic risk and Small BK are negative and insignificant. However, the interaction term
between aggregate risk and Small BK is negative and significant, suggesting that small banks
underprice aggregate risk relative to big banks. In the end, the coefficient of Small BK is
positive and significant, indicating that generally small banks charge higher lending rates.
Overall we find small banks underprice aggregate risk to idiosyncratic risk more relative to
big banks do, indicating that small banks are more aggressive in taking systemic risk. For
sensitivity analysis, we split our full sample into loans originated by small banks and big
banks and report the results in columns 2 and 3. The exercises based on Fama French equity
volatilities in columns 4 to 6 yield similar results. Taken together, we find small banks tend to
underprice systematic risk, which is different from the prediction of “too-big-to-fail” theory.
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The fact that small banks are more aggressive in underpricing aggregate risk and therefore
taking systemic risk is in line with the prediction of “too-many-to-fail” guarantee. Acharya
and Yorulmazer (2007) model the “too-many-to-fail” problem that a bank regulator finds
it ex post optimal to bail out failed banks when the number of failures is large, whereas
the probability of the collective bailout is low when the number of bank failures is small,
as failed banks can be acquired by surviving banks. The ex post optimal bailout exists in
the circumstance that the costs of injecting funds are smaller than the misallocation cost
of liquidating bank assets to outside investors in case of systemic banking crisis. Therefore,
the bailout expectation creates incentives for banks to herd ex ante in order to maximize
the likelihood of failing together and therefore collective bailout. In particular, Acharya and
Yorulmazer show that small banks have stronger incentives to take systemic risk under the
“too-many-to-fail” guarantee. The rationale is that the bailout subsidy increases for small
banks when big banks have also failed while it does not increase for big banks when small
banks have also failed. Brown and Dinc (2009) document evidence of the “too-many-to-fail”
effect that a government is less likely to close a failing bank if other banks in that country
are weak.
One caveat of our above test is that our results may be driven by the fact that small
banks with small loan portfolios cannot achieve perfect diversification and hence charge
higher spreads on idiosyncratic risk relative to aggregate risk. As loan portfolios are not
perfectly observable, we turn to directly test the “too-many-to-fail” argument by assessing
the impact of interbank correlation on loan pricing, which is not confounded by the bank level
of portfolio diversification. The idea is that lowly correlated banks have stronger incentives
to increase interbank correlation and therefore take systemic risk in order to maximize the
likelihood of failing together with systemically important banks. Therefore “too-many-to-
fail” argument predicts that small banks underprice aggregate risk relative to idiosyncratic
risk more compared to more correlated banks. To measure the interbank correlation, we
first calculate the correlation of bank daily excess return with the S&P 500 banking sector
index using the data one year prior to the quarter of loan origination. We construct a dummy
variable LowCorrBK that equals one if the bank correlation is smaller than the median value
and zero otherwise. We then interact the bank correlation with borrowers’ equity volatilities.
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We run the following regression:
LoanSpread i ,f ,b,t =c+ α1IdioV oli,t−1 + α2SysV oli,t−1 + α3IdioV oli,t−1 × LowCorrBKb,t−1















We report the results based on CAPM equity volatilities in column 1 in Table 6. We find
the idiosyncratic volatility is positively related to loan spreads, suggesting that banks charge
a risk premium for bearing the firm-specific default risk. On the contrary, the coefficient
of aggregate risk is negative but insignificant. The interaction term between idiosyncratic
volatility and low correlation dummy is positive and weakly significant. However, the inter-
action between systematic volatility and low correlation dummy is negative and significant,
suggesting that lowly correlated banks charge lower lending rates on aggregate risk relative to
more correlated banks. Taken together, we find lowly correlated banks underprice aggregate
risk more relative to more correlated banks.
To relax the restrictions of identical coefficients of the firm, loan and bank specific co-
variates for correlated and lowly correlated banks in the baseline regression, we divide our
sample into two corresponding subsamples. We report the results of sample split in the
columns 2 and 3. We find that systematic risk is negatively and significantly priced by lowly
correlated banks whereas insignificantly priced by more correlated banks. This indicates lowly
correlated banks have stronger incentives to take systematic risk of borrowers and therefore
increase systemic risk. We do the same exercise using Fama French equity volatilities and have
similar results in columns 4 to 6. Overall, we find evidence that lowly correlated banks have
stronger incentive to underprice aggregate risk and therefore take systemic risk, consistent
with the “too-many-to-fail” story.
6 Do lowly correlated banks lend more to systematically risky borrowers?
Having shown that lowly correlated banks underprice systematic risk, we examine whether
they lend more to systematically risky borrowers. A large stake in the syndicated loans
granted to systematically risky borrowers is another indicator of systemic risk-taking. We
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adopt two measures of lenders stake in syndicated lending: Share Exposure, which is the
share of the facility held by the bank, and Dollar Exposure, which is the log of facility
amount retained by the bank. We estimate the following model:
Stake i ,f ,b,t =c+ α1IdioV oli,t−1 + α2SysV oli,t−1 + α3IdioV oli,t−1 × LowCorrBKb,t−1















We report the regression results that lowly correlated banks take a large share of the loan
and a large loan size when lending to a systematically risky borrower in Table 7. We use the
relative take measure, Share Exposure, as the dependent variable in the first two columns. We
find banks generally hold a large share of the facility if the idiosyncratic risk of the borrower
is high and systematic risk is low. However, lowly correlated banks take a large share when
the borrower is systematically risky, in line with our prediction that lowly correlated banks
have stronger incentives to invest in systematic risk and to increase asset correlation. In
the last two columns we use the absolute stake measure, Dollar Exposure, as the dependent
variable. We have similar results that lowly correlated banks take a large size of loans when
the borrower is systematically risky. It is worth noting that the number of observations in the
regression drops drastically since the information of loan share retained by the lead arranger
is available for 47 % of our loan facilities. Overall, we conclude that lowly correlated banks
not only charge a lower lending rate to the systematically risky borrowers, but also take larger
stake in systematically risky loans.
7 Conclusion
This paper documents evidence of bank systemic risk taking from loan pricing data. We find
loan spreads are positively related to borrowers’ idiosyncratic risk but negatively related to
systematic risk. The lending rate discount for systematic exposure reveals banks’ preference
for increased correlation and systemic risk. We relate this collective moral hazard to the
“too-many-to-fail” guarantee in bank regulation. We show that no evidence of such systemic
risk taking could be found in the loans originated by nonbank lenders in absence of bailout
expectation. In line with the “too-many-to-fail” theory in Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007),
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we find lowly correlated and small banks are more aggressive in systemic risk taking as they
underprice systematic risk of the borrower more relative to more correlated and big banks.
This finding also suggests that our results are not driven by “too-big-to-fail” guarantee.
Our results have direct policy implications for macro prudential regulations. First, the fact
that banks take advantage of the financial safety net and pass through regulatory subsidies
to borrowers in the form of inappropriate pricing of risk may threat the stability of the whole
banking sector. The prudential regulation should be designed to force banks to internalize
the social costs incurred in the systemic crisis so that the incentive for systemic risk-taking
is dampened. In particular, bank regulation should operate at the collective level to pay
more attention to systemic risk on top of individual risk to cope with the collective moral
hazard of systemic risk-taking (Acharya, 2009). Second, much attention has been paid to
systemically important financial institutions (SIFI) which contribute substantially to systemic
risk. However, in this paper we show that small and lowly correlated banks which are
aggressive in taking systemic risk need attention for regulation as well.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
No. Mean Std. Dev 1th Median 99th
AllinDrawn 11278 208.67 124.53 20 200 578.08
Borrower Equity Volatility
TotalVol 11278 0.59 0.35 0.17 0.5 1.71
MarketVol 11278 0.16 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.4
IdioV olCAPM 11278 0.56 0.35 0.16 0.48 1.7
IdioV olFF 11278 0.56 0.35 0.15 0.47 1.69
SysV olCAPM 11278 0.12 0.11 -0.05 0.1 0.53
SysV olFF 11276 0.16 0.11 0.02 0.13 0.59
BetaCAPM 11278 0.76 0.59 -0.43 0.7 2.47
Beta mktFF 11278 0.97 0.66 -0.63 0.95 2.8
Beta smbFF 11278 0.84 0.83 -1.03 0.78 3.22
Beta hmlFF 11278 0.29 1.05 -2.61 0.3 3.13
Firm controls
Sales 11278 5.6 1.77 1.62 5.55 9.86
Leverage 11278 28.07 21.6 0 26.32 93.38
Z score 11278 4.07 7.44 -2.45 3.06 21.42
Profit Margin 11278 -20.75 1049.91 -156.99 3.19 27.55
NWC 11278 21.19 21.74 -28.73 19.7 74.26
Tangibles 11278 69.41 39.78 5.77 66.38 175.83
MRTBOOK 11278 1.82 1.48 0.67 1.45 6.81
Loan controls
Facility Size 11278 3.79 1.78 -0.69 3.91 7.38
Share Exposure 5757 56.46 37.35 4.5 50 100
Dollar Exposure 5746 2.64 1.33 -0.92 2.80 5.52
Maturity 11278 43.02 25.21 4 37 102
No. Lenders 11278 6.01 7.71 1 3 36
No. Facilities 11278 1.77 0.99 1 1 5
Revolver 11278 0.73 0.44 0 1 1
Term Loan 11278 0.24 0.43 0 0 1
Senior 11278 1 0.04 1 1 1
Secured 11278 0.75 0.43 0 1 1
Bank controls
Size BK 11278 18.15 1.92 13.13 18.21 21.27
Capital BK 11278 7.58 2.49 3.53 7.23 14.89
NPL BK 11278 0.95 1.1 0 0.56 4.91
Z Score BK 11278 3.17 0.53 0.74 3.25 4.03
ROA BK 11278 0.95 0.65 -1.69 1.04 2.24
Liquidity BK 11278 18.77 8.9 3.92 18.15 46.14
Loan Growth BK 11278 22.37 56.73 -35.89 9.19 199.01
Cost of Funds BK 11278 3.42 1.8 0.52 3.31 10.52




CAPM Fama French CAPM
IdioV olCAPM 99.26***
(5.42)








Sales -5.95*** -6.01*** -6.00***
(1.02) (1.02) (1.02)
Leverage 0.62*** 0.61*** 0.62***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Z score -0.48 -0.48 -0.48
(0.48) (0.48) (0.48)
Profit Margin -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.26***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
NWC -0.24*** -0.23*** -0.24***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Tangibles -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
MRTBOOK -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Facility Size -8.98*** -8.85*** -8.99***
(1.08) (1.08) (1.08)
Maturity -0.40*** -0.40*** -0.40***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
No. Lenders -0.52*** -0.53*** -0.53***
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
No. Facilities 11.97*** 11.91*** 12.02***
(1.61) (1.62) (1.62)
Revolver -39.67*** -39.39*** -39.65***
(6.94) (6.92) (6.95)
Term Loan -9.44 -9.20 -9.47
(7.25) (7.24) (7.26)
Senior -193.77*** -194.07*** -193.66***
(44.49) (44.38) (44.40)
Secured 74.21*** 74.30*** 74.42***
(2.45) (2.45) (2.45)
Size BK -4.86*** -4.86*** -4.88***
(0.94) (0.94) (0.94)
Capital BK -2.47*** -2.45*** -2.47***
(0.75) (0.75) (0.75)
NPL BK 4.11** 4.08** 4.13**
(1.64) (1.64) (1.64)
ROA BK 1.82 1.87 1.77
(2.27) (2.27) (2.27)
Z Score BK -2.03 -1.99 -2.08
(2.87) (2.87) (2.87)
Liquidity BK -0.22 -0.22 -0.22
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
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Loan Growth BK -0.07** -0.07** -0.07**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Cost of Funds BK -3.04** -3.02** -3.07**
(1.23) (1.22) (1.23)
Constant 528.76*** 530.93*** 529.12***
(49.62) (49.51) (49.54)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Loan Purpose Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,278 11,276 11,278
R-squared 0.554 0.555 0.554
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Table 3: Panel Regressions
The dependent variable is all-in-drawn spread. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at
the borrower level in the first two columns and at the bank level in the last two columns and
reported in parentheses below coefficients. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAPM Fama French CAPM Fama French
IdioV olCAPM 108.93*** 99.16***
(8.79) (7.20)
SysV olCAPM -45.45** -48.53***
(19.38) (15.52)
IdioV olFF 111.41*** 102.76***
(9.11) (6.54)
SysV olFF -35.02* -42.88**
(20.24) (17.09)
Firm control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes No No
Number of Firms 4,183 4,182 N.A. N.A.
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Number of Banks N.A. N.A. 381 381
Observations 11,278 11,276 11,278 11,276
R-squared 0.329 0.329 0.487 0.487
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Table 4: Nonbank and Bank Lenders
The dependent variable is all-in-drawn spread. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at
the borrower level and reported in parentheses below coefficients. ***, **, * denote significance
at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nonbank Bank Nonbank Bank
IdioV olCAPM 59.38*** 100.04***
(11.58) (5.39)
SysV olCAPM 76.00** -34.47**
(38.59) (13.58)
IdioV olFF 55.17*** 103.52***
(12.35) (5.72)
SysV olFF 65.36* -34.84***
(39.12) (13.36)
Firm control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,788 12,080 1,785 12,078
R-squared 0.348 0.536 0.348 0.536
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Table 5: Bank size matters
The dependent variable is all-in-drawn spread. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at
the borrower level and reported in parentheses below coefficients. ***, **, * denote significance
at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Small Big Full Small Big
IdioV olCAPM 107.28*** 85.75*** 120.80***
(8.54) (6.28) (9.71)
SysV olCAPM -14.71 -71.22*** -14.70
(18.42) (17.64) (19.84)
IdioV olCAPM ∗ smallBK -11.90
(9.01)
SysV olCAPM ∗ smallBK -55.97**
(22.31)
IdioV olFF 108.42*** 92.67*** 122.32***
(9.04) (6.73) (10.17)
SysV olFF -10.51 -76.20*** -12.26
(17.67) (17.81) (18.72)
IdioV olFF ∗ smallBK -6.82
(9.57)




Firm control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,278 5,579 5,699 11,276 5,578 5,698
R-squared 0.553 0.501 0.577 0.554 0.502 0.577
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Table 6: Loan pricing depends on bank correlation
The dependent variable is all-in-drawn spread. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at
the borrower level and reported in parentheses below coefficients. ***, **, * denote significance
at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Less Corr. More Corr. Full Less Corr. More Corr.
IdioV olCAPM 93.38*** 96.63*** 106.75***
(7.72) (8.13) (8.82)






IdioV olFF 94.80*** 102.36*** 109.54***
(8.11) (8.58) (9.19)
SysV olFF -11.07 -67.51*** -19.51
(17.67) (21.62) (18.46)
IdioV olFF *LowCorrBK 21.42**
(9.46)




Firm control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9,251 4,585 4,666 9,249 4,584 4,665
R-squared 0.565 0.583 0.561 0.566 0.584 0.562
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Table 7: Share and Size of loans
The dependent variables are the share of facility held by the bank (Share Exposure) in the
first two columns and the log of facility amount held by the bank (Dollar Exposure) in the
last two columns, respectively. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the borrower
level and reported in parentheses below coefficients. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%
and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share Exposure Share Exposure Dollar Exposure Dollar Exposure
IdioV olCAPM 11.55*** -0.28***
(2.42) (0.10)
SysV olCAPM -19.18*** 0.15
(6.04) (0.22)
IdioV olCAPM*LowCorrBK -1.86 -0.18
(2.61) (0.11)
SysV olCAPM*LowCorrBK 20.74** 0.84**
(8.59) (0.33)
IdioV olFF 12.46*** 0.27***
(2.57) (0.05)
SysV olFF -15.45** -0.38***
(6.21) (0.14)
IdioV olFF *LowCorrBK -3.43 -0.08
(2.82) (0.05)
SysV olFF *LowCorrBK 21.93** 0.31*
(9.33) (0.16)
LowCorrBK 0.27 0.14 -0.01 0.01
(1.89) (1.86) (0.08) (0.04)
Firm control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,455 4,454 4,447 4,446
R-squared 0.706 0.706 0.587 0.894
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APPENDIX
Table 8: Variables and Sources
Variable Definition and Calculation Source
AllinDrawn All-in-drawn spread is a spread over Libor. Dealscan
Equity volatility of borrowers
IdioV olCAPM Idiosyncratic volatility using one factor
CAPM regressions. Defined as the
standard deviation of the residual.
CRSP
SysV olCAPM Systematic volatility using one factor
CAPM regressions. Defined as the
product of beta and market volatility.
CRSP
IdioV olFF Idiosyncratic volatility from Fama French
three factor model. Defined as the
standard deviation of the residual.
CRSP and
WRDS
SysV olFF Systematic volatility from Fama French
three factor model. Defined as the total
volatility that is attributable to Fama




BetaCAPM Equity beta estimated from the CAPM
regression.
CRSP
Beta mktFF Market beta estimated from the Fama
French three factor regression.
CRSP and
WRDS




Beta hmlFF Value beta estimated from the Fama
French three factor regression.
CRSP and
WRDS
TotalV ol Total equity volatility, defined as the
standard deviation of daily excess return
one year before the facility start date.
CRSP
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Table 9: Variables and Sources: Continue
Variable Definition and Calculation Source
Firm level controls
Sales log of firm sales at close. Dealscan
Leverage Firm leverage defined as sum of long term
and short term debts over total assets.
Compustat
Z score Firm Z score 1.2 × (act − lct)/at + 1.4 ×
(re/at) + 3.3× (oiadp/at) + 0.6× (prcc×
csho/lt) + 0.999× (sale/at)
Compustat
Profit Margin Profit margin over sales. Compustat
NWC Net working capital over total assets. Compustat
Tangibles Tangible assets over total assets. Compustat
MRTBOOK Market to book ratio. Compustat
Loan level controls
Facility Size Log of facility amount, adjusted for
currency and unit
Dealscan
Share Exposure The share of loans retained by the lead
arranger in the facility.
Dealscan
Dollar Exposure Log of the amount of loans retained by the
lead arranger in the facility.
Dealscan
Maturity Maturity of the facility in terms of months Dealscan
No. Lenders Number of lenders in a tranche of a
syndicated loan deal
Dealscan
No. Facilities Number of facilities (tranches) in a
syndicated loan deal
Dealscan
Revolver dummy for lines of credit. Dealscan
Term Loan dummy for term loans. Dealscan
Senior dummy for senior loans. Dealscan
Secured dummy for loans with collateral. Dealscan
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Table 10: Variables and Sources: Continue
Variable Definition and Calculation Source
Bank level controls
Size BK Log of bank total assets. Call reports and
FR-Y9C
Small BK Dummy for small banks. Call reports and
FR-Y9C
Capital BK Bank equity over total assets. Call reports and
FR-Y9C
NPL BK Nonperforming loans over gross loans. Call reports and
FR-Y9C
Z Score BK Bank Z score, defined as sum of equity
asset ratio and ROA divided by standard
deviation of ROA. We use 8-quarter
rolling window when calculating the
standard deviation of ROA. We take log




ROA BK Return on assets. Call reports and
FR-Y9C
Liquidity BK Liquid assets over total assets. Call reports and
FR-Y9C
Loan Growth BK Growth rates of gross loans. Call reports and
FR-Y9C
Cost of Funds BK Cost of funds, defined as total interest
expenses over total liabilities.
Call reports and
FR-Y9C
InterbankCorr Interbank correlation, defined as the
correlation between bank stock return and
S&P 500 bank sector index.
CRSP and
Datastream
LowCorrBK Dummy for less correlated banks of which
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